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CLERK OF WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT

STATE OF WISCONSIN
IN SUPREME COURT

No. 2018AP183-CR

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GENERAL GRANT WILSON,

Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

**RESPONSE AND SUPPLEMENTAL
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR REVIEW**

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INTRODUCTION

The State of Wisconsin opposes the petition for review filed by Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner General Grant Wilson. The petition seeks review and, ultimately, a new trial for Wilson, based on four ineffective assistance claims—all rejected by both the circuit court (after a three-day evidentiary hearing) and the court of appeals.

The petition asserts that review is warranted because the court of appeals “misstated” the law by “nudg[ing] the standard for evaluating prejudice in an erroneously more onerous direction.” (Wilson’s Pet. 7, 10.) That’s not true. The court of appeals articulated the prejudice standard—“whether there is a substantial likelihood of a different outcome”¹—precisely as the United States Supreme Court has stated it.² It neither misstated the law nor moved the standard in any direction.

The petition also asserts that review is warranted because the court of appeals “misapplied” the standard because it “seems to have demanded” more from Wilson than the standard requires. (Wilson’s Pet. 10.) Wilson’s claims rightly faced “*Strickland*’s high bar,” and it is well established that “[s]urmounting [that bar] is never an easy task.”³ Wilson disagrees with the answer the court of appeals gave to the question of whether, given trial counsel’s deficient

¹ Pet-App. 13 ¶ 29.

² *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (“A probability sufficient to undermine confidence exists when there is ‘a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a different result.”); *State v. Cooper*, 2019 WI 73, ¶ 30, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192 (concluding no prejudice existed because defendant had not shown “a substantial likelihood of a different outcome”).

³ *State v. Savage*, 2020 WI 93, ¶ 27, 395 Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838 (quoting *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)).

performance, there was a substantial likelihood of a different outcome absent the errors.⁴ The court of appeals got it right—Wilson failed to prove prejudice. Because his claim has no merit, further review by this Court would be a waste of time.

Even if there were merit to Wilson’s error argument, his petition would be insufficient to warrant review unless it also can meet one of the statutory criteria. This is not an error-correcting court.⁵ As explained below, it does not meet any of the criteria.

Review is therefore not warranted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE⁶

This is a *Strickland* prejudice case that is based on four claims of deficient performance.

Wilson attempted to introduce Denny evidence at trial.

Wilson was tried for intentional homicide and attempted homicide for shooting into a car where Evania Maric was sitting with Willie Friend on April 21, 1993. (Pet-App. 2, ¶ 2.) Maric died. (Pet-App. 2, ¶ 2.) Friend told police

⁴ *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

⁵ *State v. Mosley*, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665, 307 N.W.2d 200 (1981) (“It is not the primary purpose of this court . . . merely to correct error in trial court proceedings[,] a function now largely met by the court of appeals[,] but instead to oversee and implement the statewide development of the law.”); *State v. Minued*, 141 Wis. 2d 325, 328, 415 N.W.2d 515 (1987) (“It is not this court’s institutional role to perform this error correcting function.”); *State ex rel. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Wisconsin Ct. of Appeals, Dist. IV*, 2018 WI 25, ¶ 43, 380 Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114 (“The criteria for granting [a petition for review] . . . do not encompass correcting an appellate tribunal’s simple error of law.”).

⁶ These facts are taken from the circuit court’s order and the court of appeals’ decision included in the petitioner’s appendix, as well as the decisions the court of appeals and this Court have issued in this case.

Wilson was the shooter and testified for the State at Wilson's trial. (Pet-App. 2, ¶ 2.)

At his 1993 trial, Wilson's theory was that Friend's accomplices did the shooting. (Pet-App. 2, ¶ 3.) The trial court refused to permit Wilson to present testimony that Friend was a pimp who prostituted Maric, and testimony from witnesses who had seen Friend threaten and hit Maric in the weeks before she was killed. (Pet-App. 3–4.)

Wilson was convicted and ultimately appealed. *State v. Wilson (Wilson I)*, No. 2011AP1803-CR, 2013 WL 12183521, at *1, n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished). (R-App. 101–111.)⁷ He raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims and a claim that the court erred by barring his use of third-party perpetrator evidence pursuant to *State v. Denny*, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 624, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984) (adopting the “legitimate tendency” test: such evidence is admissible “as long as motive and opportunity have been shown and . . . there is also some evidence to directly connect a third person to the crime charged”).

The court of appeals vacated the conviction and granted a new trial on the ground that Wilson was wrongly denied the opportunity to present Denny evidence.

The court of appeals granted Wilson a new trial in 2013 on the grounds that the circuit court wrongly denied Wilson's attempt to present *Denny* evidence to show that the murder was “a set up ‘hit’ and attempt to frame [Wilson] . . .” *Wilson I*, 2013 WL 12183521, at *5. (R-App. 110.) The State argued

⁷ Wilson's postconviction counsel filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial based on the court's decision to exclude the proffered testimony, but when the court denied the motion, counsel failed to file an appeal. *State v. Wilson*, 2015 WI 48, ¶ 8, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52. After Wilson brought counsel's error to light, the court of appeals reinstated Wilson's right to direct appeal in September of 2010. *Id.*

that Wilson could not show that Friend had an opportunity to commit the crime, but the court of appeals rejected this argument, concluding that Friend had “the opportunity to commit this crime, either directly by firing the first weapon or in conjunction with others by luring Maric to the place where she was killed.” *Id.* at *4. (R-App. 107.) The court did not reach Wilson’s claims of ineffective assistance.

This Court reversed the order for a new trial.

This Court accepted review and reversed. Rejecting Wilson’s arguments, this Court concluded that he had failed to satisfy the “opportunity” prong of the test because both at trial and in his postconviction motion Wilson “failed to proffer any evidence that would elevate the theory of Friend’s involvement in an assassination conspiracy from a mere possibility to a legitimate tendency.” *State v. Wilson (Wilson II)*, 2015 WI 48, ¶ 83, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52.

This Court concluded that Wilson had “proffered no evidence demonstrating that Friend had the *opportunity* to arrange a hit on Maric during the relatively short time they were in Maric’s car—no evidence that Friend had the contacts, influence, and finances to quickly hire or engage a shooter or shooters to gun down a woman on a public street.” *Wilson II*, 362 Wis. 2d 193, ¶ 85. This Court added that Wilson had offered no evidence “that Friend or his alleged unnamed associates had access to a gold Lincoln Continental similar to Wilson’s,” which was the gunman’s car, according to witnesses; and that he “ha[d] not identified any individuals as being the shooter or shooters possibly employed by Friend.” *Id.* ¶ 85. This Court reiterated that *Denny* requires “more than a theory ‘that simply affords a possible ground of suspicion’” and therefore concluded that the circuit court had not erred when it denied Wilson’s attempt to present the *Denny* evidence. *Id.* ¶¶ 88, 90 (quoting *Denny*, 120 Wis. 2d at 623).

The court of appeals then received the case on remand for proceedings to resolve Wilson's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. *State v. Wilson (Wilson III)*, No. 2011AP1803-CR, 2016 WL 8649257, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2016). (R-App. 112–117.)

Following remand, the court of appeals ordered an evidentiary hearing on Wilson's remaining claims.

The court of appeals concluded that Wilson was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. *Wilson III*, 2016 WL 8649257, at *1. (R-App. 112–13.)

The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing over the course of three days in 2017. (Pet-App. 33 n.1.)

With regard to the claim that trial counsel's failure to present *Denny* evidence prejudiced Wilson, the circuit court heard testimony from friends of Maric that Friend was a pimp who had threatened to kill Maric if she left prostitution and that they had seen evidence of his physical abuse of her. (Pet-App. 34–35.) The circuit court concluded that Wilson was not entitled to the *Denny* evidence because this evidence was "based on mere possibility and speculation." (Pet-App. 35.) It cited this Court's previous decision in this case for the proposition that the "legitimate tendency" test requires "more than mere possibility." (Pet-App. 35.) Therefore, the court concluded that Wilson had not proved ineffectiveness.

Wilson's second claim concerned trial counsel's failure to tell the jury that Wilson's .44 caliber revolver was not the same as the .44 caliber revolver that police determined was used in the murder. (Pet-App. 36.) The circuit court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that this information would have changed the outcome in light of the facts that the gun used in the shooting was never found, that the only

evidence that Wilson had owned a different kind of .44-caliber gun was “the defendant’s word,” and that Wilson’s credibility was compromised by his admission on the stand that he falsely told police that he had never owned a .44-caliber revolver. (Pet-App. 36, 38–39.)

Wilson’s third claim concerned trial counsel’s failure to use lab reports and medical evidence to attack Friend’s credibility on cross-examination. (Pet-App. 35.) Wilson argued that Friend, who testified that Maric had eaten chicken prior to her death and that she had had sex with him, and these statements could have been impeached with medical evidence that counsel could have obtained. The circuit court concluded that counsel’s “failure to delve into these matters did not prejudice the defendant’s case.” (Pet-App. 35.)

Wilson’s fourth claim concerned a hearsay objection counsel made, and then withdrew, to testimony from Friend about a statement Maric had made to him shortly before she was killed. Friend testified that Maric said Wilson had tried to run her off the road and “threatened to kill her by pointing a gun at her if she didn’t stop seeing Friend.” (Pet-App. 36.) At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel conceded that he was “wrong” to withdraw the objection after the circuit court had sustained it.⁸ (Pet-App. 6, ¶ 12.) The circuit court concluded there was no prejudice from this because the statement would have come in under a hearsay exception as an excited

⁸ Trial counsel conceded at the *Machner* hearing that the withdrawal of the hearsay objection was wrong, and he conceded that the evidence was damaging. The State does not agree with Wilson’s statement that trial counsel “conceded on the stand that he had damaged Wilson’s case by *going out of his way* to enable the state to get admitted at trial ‘pretty damning’ hearsay.” (Wilson’s Pet. 5.) There was no concession that counsel went “out of his way” to help the prosecution.

utterance, given the factual circumstances in which the statement was made. (Pet-App. 37.)

The circuit court concluded that “[t]he evidence adduced at three days of evidentiary hearings does not extend much beyond what was previously presented and is insufficient to demonstrate that a new trial is warranted” (Pet-App. 40.) It quoted at length from Justice Ziegler’s concurrence in *Wilson II* as support for its conclusion that the new evidence did not solve the opportunity prong problem. (Pet-App. 40.)

Because the circuit court found no prejudice for the individual claims, it did not reach the claim of cumulative prejudice.

Wilson appealed the circuit court’s order denying his motion for a new trial.

Wilson appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial. Quoting extensively from this Court’s opinion restating the standards for satisfying the “opportunity” prong of the *Denny* test, the court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that Wilson was not entitled to a new trial. (Pet-App. 2.) It assumed deficient performance but concluded that the errors had not prejudiced Wilson, in part because, given the opportunity to present evidence, he still had come up with nothing: “Wilson has still failed to provide evidence of opportunity by Friend—or any other third party—at the level of clarity dictated by the reasoning in *Wilson*.” (Pet-App. 9, ¶ 21.)

It rejected Wilson’s four claims on the same grounds as the circuit court, finding that there was no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the errors. (Pet-App. 7, ¶ 16.)

Judge Brash dissented. (Pet-App. 15.) He concluded that Wilson had presented “significant additional facts” and that this evidence made the difference to the prejudice

analysis on the *Denny* evidence claim. (Pet-App. 22–23, 25, ¶¶ 49, 54–55.) He further concluded that the “cumulative effect” of the claimed errors⁹ was prejudicial and warranted remand for a new trial. (Pet-App. 15, ¶ 32.)

The difference between the majority and the dissent boiled down to whether the following evidence turned Wilson’s proffer from “mere speculation” to “legitimate tendency”:

(1) Maric worked as a prostitute; (2) Friend and/or Larnell were her pimps; (3) Maric wanted to stop working as a prostitute; (4) Friend beat Maric and threatened to kill her if she stopped working as a prostitute in the weeks before she was killed; (5) Larnell’s after-hours club, in front of which Maric was killed, was known for prostitution; (6) the after-hours club used a metal detector to screen patrons, suggesting that persons carrying weapons frequented the establishment; (7) Friend, Larnell, and Marshall Friend—a brother of Friend and Larnell—were all [] at the after-hours club when Maric was killed; and (8) Friend, Larnell, and Marshall had extensive criminal records and were known to police.

(Pet-App. 22–23, ¶ 49.)

In the view of the dissent, this information went “well beyond” the unsuccessful offer of proof made at trial, and the dissent concluded that the proffer was no longer “too speculative.” (Pet-App. 23, ¶ 50.) The majority viewed those facts against the language of *Wilson II* and concluded, “There remains no solid evidence to prove that Friend was involved in arranging or hiring one or more persons to shoot Maric.”

⁹ *State v. Thiel*, 2003 WI 111, ¶ 60, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (a court “may aggregate the effects of multiple incidents of deficient performance in determining whether the overall impact of the deficiencies satisfied the standard for a new trial under Strickland”).

(Pet-App. 8, ¶ 19.) It rejected the “assumptions” in the dissent’s analysis. (Pet-App. 9, ¶ 22.)

Wilson petitioned this Court for review. This Court ordered the State to respond to the petition.

CRITERIA FOR REVIEW

Wilson’s petition does not warrant review under any of the criteria he identifies.

Wilson states that his petition “comes within the criteria” of three of the subsections of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r):

- “A real and significant question of federal or state constitutional law is presented.” Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(a).
- “A decision by the supreme court will help develop, clarify or harmonize the law, and . . . [t]he question presented is not factual in nature but rather is a question of law of the type that is likely to recur unless resolved by the supreme court.” Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(c)3.
- “The court of appeals’ decision is in conflict with controlling opinions of the United States Supreme Court or the supreme court or other court of appeals’ decisions.” Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(d).

(Wilson’s Pet. 7)

Wilson’s petition does not fall into any of those categories.

A. There is no real and significant question of federal or state constitutional law.

Although the petition states that it “comes within the criteria” of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(a) (Wilson’s Pet. 7), Wilson has articulated no argument that the case presents a “real and significant question of federal or state constitutional law.” It does not.

It is true that there is little to be gleaned from case law on what satisfies the section 809.62(1r)(c) requirement, as “orders granting or denying petitions for review do not state the reasons for the court’s actions.”¹⁰ But it is apparent that it takes more to satisfy this requirement than the mere presence of commonplace claims of constitutional violations (as here, of the rights to counsel and due process).

The State discerns no such “real and significant” constitutional question in this case. At this point in the case, the question at issue is an ordinary, straightforward *Strickland* cumulative prejudice claim, governed by *Thiel*. Wilson’s assertion that the petition warrants review because the court of appeals wrongly *applied* the law is a different argument. That is an assertion that review is warranted under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(d), and the State addresses that argument below.

B. There is no likely-to-recur question of law that needs clarifying or harmonizing.

Wilson argues that the case merits review because “the case presents an opportunity for the court to develop the law as to what is required of counsel in order to effectively investigate and present” a *Denny* defense. (Wilson’s Pet. 7, 14.) To be entitled to review under Wis. Stat. § (Rule)

¹⁰ Michael S. Heffernan, *Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin*, § 23.9 (8th ed. 2020).

809.62(1r)(c)3., he must show both that “[a] decision by the supreme court will help develop, clarify or harmonize the law” *and* that “[t]he question is not factual in nature but rather is a question of law of the type presented that is likely to recur unless resolved by the supreme court.” But he cannot show either.

Wilson cannot show that the law that governs this case needs developing, clarifying or harmonizing. Resolving Wilson’s claims requires the application of legal standards that have been clearly stated: the *Strickland* prejudice standard, the *Thiel* cumulative prejudice rule, and the *Wilson II* clarification of the opportunity prong requirement for third-party perpetrator evidence. There is nothing that is unclear about these legal standards and no conflict in the case law about them.

And Wilson cannot show that “the question is not factual in nature” because this case is *exceptionally* “factual in nature.” The issues arise from a seven-day jury trial and a three-day evidentiary hearing that resulted in numerous factual findings by the circuit court. (Pet-App. 15, 33–36.) In the court of appeals’ opinion, both the majority and dissent contain extended discussions of the facts. (Pet-App. 9–13, 18–19, 22–23.) Wilson is not entitled to review under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(c)3.

C. There is no conflict with controlling case law.

Wilson asserts that the court of appeals’ decision conflicts with controlling case law in two respects. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(d).

He argues that the court of appeals misstated the *Strickland* prejudice standard when rather than using the “ordinary and standard phrasing” to describe the prejudice standard, it instead stated, “The ultimate question is whether

there was a substantial likelihood of a different outcome but for trial counsel's presumed deficient performance." (Pet-App. 13, ¶ 29.) This Court has used the same phrasing, directly quoting the United States Supreme Court. *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) ("A probability sufficient to undermine confidence exists when there is 'a "substantial," not just "conceivable," likelihood of a different result.""); *State v. Cooper*, 2019 WI 73, ¶ 30, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192 (concluding no prejudice existed because defendant had not shown "a substantial likelihood of a different outcome"). Those courts used that language without changing the legal standard, and so did the court of appeals. There is nothing nefarious afoot.

He further argues that the court of appeals essentially shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defendant, citing a United States Supreme Court decision that reversed a lower court for that error. (Wilson's Pet. 12.)

He points to the following "hard to parse" sentence from the court of appeals' opinion: "Wilson is correct that there are inconsistencies in the record about what happened during the hours before the shooting but none of [the inconsistencies] make[s] Friend's testimony incredible or, if disproven, that a reasonable jury could only discount his account entirely." (Pet-App. 10–11, ¶ 25.) The court's point is that an inconsistency, even one resolved in Wilson's favor, does not necessarily render Friend's testimony incredible in its entirety; the jury could choose to believe some parts and not others. In any event, there is a good deal of distance between that sentence and the prove-your-innocence requirement overruled in *Holmes v. South Carolina*, 547 U.S. 319, 328–29 (2006), the case cited by Wilson. There the lower court had stated that the proffered *Denny*-type evidence failed because it "did not raise a 'reasonable inference' as to appellant's own

innocence.” *Id.* The court of appeals’ decision here did not say that, and its statement therefore does not need any correction.

On the contrary, the court of appeals expressly cited and applied the standards from this Court in reaching its decision, repeatedly holding Wilson’s facts up to this Court’s tough language in *Wilson II* and concluding that there was not enough there to satisfy “the level of clarity dictated by the reasoning in *Wilson [III]*.” (Pet-App. 9, 13.) It concluded that Wilson’s theory—that unknown assassins killed the victim at the behest of her pimp—remained too speculative to satisfy the opportunity prong requirement. It concluded, “When we *apply the Wilson standards*, we remain confident in the fairness of the trial process and outcome,” adding, “Wilson’s theory that Friend conspired to murder Maric remains speculative *under these standards*.” (Pet-App. 13, ¶ 29 (emphasis added).)

The fact that there was a vigorous dissent in the court of appeals does not make this petition worthy of review. The majority and dissent come to different conclusions about how settled law applies to the facts of this case. Applying the same law to the circuit court’s findings of fact, the dissent concluded that Wilson was entitled to a new trial, and the majority concluded that he was not. A difference of judicial opinion about whether *Thiel* requires granting a new trial on the ground of cumulative prejudice in a highly fact-driven analysis is not a basis for this Court’s review.

D. The court of appeals’ majority properly focused on whether the claimed instances of deficient performance prejudiced Wilson.

The analysis in this case comes down to one thing: *Strickland* prejudice.

Wilson appears to argue that trial counsel’s long record of professional misconduct plays some role in the prejudice

analysis. He details trial counsel's professional discipline by this Court related to the representation of Wilson, as well as subsequent discipline proceedings in 2012, 2016, and 2020. (Wilson's Pet. 4 n.4.) He cites this history as a basis for this Court to grant him a new trial:

[T]he Court should be prepared here to provide the relatively retrospective relief (to order a new trial) that is the only remedy of any value to a defendant as ill served and prejudiced by an officer of the court as Wilson was by [Attorney] Kovac.

(Wilson's Pet. 4 n.4.)

That argument is unpersuasive. The claim presented to the circuit court in Wilson's postconviction motion were that four *specific* errors by trial counsel (related to the investigation of the third-party perpetrator defense, the cross-examination of a key witness, the type of gun Wilson said he owned, and the withdrawn hearsay objection) constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet-App. 33–37.) Both the circuit court and the court of appeals assumed deficient performance as to these claims. (Pet-App. 2, 37.) The point of the prejudice analysis is to weigh whether that deficient performance made a difference in the outcome—and that is the only relevant measure of deficient performance.

Besides, as this Court has recognized, discipline for professional misconduct is not the equivalent of a finding of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. In *Cooper*,¹¹ this Court rejected a defendant's claim that Court discipline for multiple acts of professional misconduct (even when it was for counsel's errors in representation of the defendant claiming ineffective assistance), constituted proof of ineffective assistance. This Court held that such discipline

¹¹ *Cooper*, 387 Wis. 2d 439.

“cannot mean, ipso facto, that [counsel] performed deficiently within *Strickland*’s meaning.”¹²

Here, the question is not whether counsel’s performance was deficient; both courts assumed so as to each of his allegations. As in *Cooper*, the history of discipline here “adds nothing to the ineffective assistance analysis.”¹³ The question remaining is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent those errors, and neither the discipline related to his handling of Wilson’s case nor his subsequent discipline answers that question.

* * * * *

Wilson has not satisfied any of this Court’s criteria for review.

¹² *Id.* ¶ 22.

¹³ *Id.* ¶¶ 23–24 (capitalization altered).

CONCLUSION

This Court should deny the petition for review.

Dated this 16th day of June 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this response conforms to the rules contained in Wis. Stat. § 809.62(4) for a response to petition for review produced with a proportional serif font. The length of this response is 4,191 words.

Dated this 16th day of June 2021.

SONYA K. BICE
Assistant Attorney General

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH WIS. STAT. § (RULE) 809.62(4)(b)**

I hereby certify that:

I have submitted an electronic copy of this response to petition for review, excluding the appendix, if any, which complies with the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.62(4)(b) and 809.19(12).

I further certify that:

This electronic response to petition for review is identical in content and format to the printed form of the response to petition for review filed as of this date.

A copy of this certificate has been served with the paper copies of this response to petition for review filed with the court and served on all opposing parties.

Dated this 16th day of June 2021.

SONYA K. BICE
Assistant Attorney General

Supplemental Appendix
State of Wisconsin v. General Grant Wilson
Case No. 2018AP183-CR

<u>Description of Document</u>	<u>Pages</u>
<i>State of Wisconsin v. General Grant Wilson</i> , No. 2011AP1803-CR, Court of Appeals Decision, dated Oct. 22, 2013	101–111
<i>State of Wisconsin v. General Grant Wilson</i> , No. 2011AP1803-CR, Court of Appeals Decision, dated Nov. 15, 2016	112–117

APPENDIX CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that filed with this response to petition for review, either as a separate document or as a part of this response, is a supplemental appendix that complies with the content requirements of Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.62(2)(f); that is, the record documents contained in the respondent's supplemental appendix fall into one of the categories specified in sub. (2)(f).

I further certify that if the record is required by law to be confidential, the portions of the record included in the appendix are reproduced using first names and last initials instead of full names of persons, specifically including juveniles and parents of juveniles, with a notation that the portions of the record have been so reproduced to preserve confidentiality and with appropriate references to the record.

Dated this 16th day of June 2021.

SONYA K. BICE
Assistant Attorney General

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH WIS. STAT. § (RULE) 809.19(13)**

I hereby certify that:

I have submitted an electronic copy of this appendix, which complies with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(13).

I further certify that:

This electronic appendix is identical in content to the printed form of the appendix filed as of this date.

A copy of this certificate has been served with the paper copies of this appendix filed with the court and served on all opposing parties.

Dated this 16th day of June 2021.

SONYA K. BICE
Assistant Attorney General