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State of Wisconsin

Court of Appeals District I

Case No. 2022AP187 and 2022AP188

State of Wisconsin,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Michele M. Ford,

Milwaukee County Cases 21CM1807 and 21CM3452

Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from Incompetency Finding, Entered in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Hon. Jack Davila, Presiding

Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant

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
Attorney for Michele Ford

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Argument

I. The notice of appeal was timely and the State's assertion that it was not is incorrect.

The State argues that Ms. Ford was subject to a shortened deadline to appeal her case because the circuit court e-filed this document:



In other words, the State is trying to get this court to altogether deny Ms. Ford her right to an appeal by construing an "Order of Commitment for Treatment" from a judge as a "notice of entry of a final judgment or order" under Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1). (State's Br., p. 5).

This is wrong. A "notice of entry of a final judgment or order" is a separate written document, other than the judgment or order, served by a party after the order was entered, containing the date of entry of the final order. *See* 806.06(3); *Soquet v. Soquet*, 117 Wis.2d 553, 557, 345 N.W.2d 401 (1984).

The above document is not the sort of document that the State can use to reduce the time for an appeal. For one thing, a notice of entry is to be served

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by a party, not the court. *Id.* The State never served her with anything of the kind.

But the State argues that, because the "Order of Commitment for Treatment" is in writing, and because it says she was committed on November 11, 2021, and because this happens to be the same day that the court found her incompetent, and because after all her attorneys were present in court when she was found not competent, Ms. Ford had notice of the court's decision and should be subject to the shorter deadline. (State's Br., p. 7).

This argument is precluded by *Soquet v. Soquet*, which says that precise written notice, not just actual notice, is required to shorten the deadline. *Id* at 558. The argument is also nonsensical. Appeals are not possible unless there is a written order or judgment. Since all court orders must be served on all parties, under this argument, all appeals would be subject to a 45-day deadline and the 90-day deadline would never apply.

The State did not serve a notice of entry on Ms. Ford. Therefore, the deadline was not shortened to 45 days. Ms. Ford's appeal, which was filed on the 88th day, was timely, and this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.

II. Ms. Ford's liability for the cost of care during her commitment is a collateral consequence that precludes the State's mootness argument.

The State argues that this appeal is moot because Ms. Ford was later found competent to proceed and because the cases were administratively closed. It argues that the incompetency finding therefore no longer has any force, meaning, or impact. (State's Br., p. 8).

But an appeal is not moot if the direct or collateral consequences of the order persist and vacatur of that order would practically affect those consequences. *Sauk County v. S.A.M.,* 2022 WI 46, ¶19. It is therefore not enough for the State to show that Ms. Ford was found competent and the underlying proceedings closed. It must show that there is no practical effect to leaving the orders in place.

The mootness argument fails because of the holding in *Sauk County v. S.A.M.*, which found that a person's mandatory liability for the cost of the care received during a commitment is a collateral consequence. *Id.* at 924.

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S.A.M. pointed to Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2), under which a committed person:

[S]hall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and supplies related to each commitment period. If the underlying commitment order is vacated, however, the liability tied to that particular commitment period no longer exists. See <code>Jankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104 Wis.2d 431, 438-40, 312 N.W.2d 45 (1981); Ethelyn I.C. v. Waukesha County, 221 Wis.2d 109, 120-21, 584 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1998). For that reason, a direct causal relationship exists between vacating an expired recommitment order and removing the liability it creates, sufficient to render recommitment appeals not moot.</code>

Id. at ¶24.

Ms. Ford is in the exact same situation as S.A.M. because Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2) applies to people like Ms. Ford, committed for competency remediation under § 971.14(5). This case is therefore not moot.

III. Remand for a *Machner* hearing is not required but would be welcomed if ordered.

The State argues that Ms. Ford cannot raise the issues in her brief because they were raised for the first time on appeal. (State's Br., p. 9). But Ms. Ford has argued that her constitutional right to counsel was violated. Failure to object cannot forfeit constitutional rights. *See State v. Ndina*, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶ 29–31, 315 Wis.2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (citations omitted).

Next, the State argues that Ms. Ford should have raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel before filing this appeal and cites *State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard*, 2014 WI 38, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805 for the proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should start in the circuit court unless the circuit court is unable to grant relief. (State's Br., p. 10). The circuit court was unable to grant relief here because civil appeals like this one begin in the court of appeals. That is why Ms. Ford included an alternate request for remand for postconviction factfinding in her opening brief.

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Finally, the State tries to make it seem that remand for fact-finding is strictly necessary because it is otherwise unclear how trial counsel's breach of the duty of confidentiality amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel under the facts of this case. (State's Br., p. 10-11). It does this by building and then knocking down a straw man—pretending that Ms. Ford has argued that all breaches of confidentiality are per se deficient performance—instead of engaging with her real argument. There is no need for a finding that confidentiality was breached because it was obviously breached. Ms. Ford wanted to be found competent. Trial counsel provided the competency evaluator with information that helped accomplish the opposite. The record allows no other reasonable inference, and the State does not suggest one.

Moreover, the State sidesteps the real nature of Ms. Ford's reliance on *Weaver v. Massachusetts*. Although *Weaver* found there was no per-se fundamental unfairness under the facts of that case, it made it clear that prejudice is not required in every single case alleging ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant can show that the proceedings were rendered fundamentally unfair. 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910, 1911 (2017). Ms. Ford argued at length that her trial counsel's breach of confidentiality in order to advocate *against* Ms. Ford's goals is the sort of case in which counsel's deficient performance rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. (Ms. Ford's Br., p. 9-11). The State simply refuses to engage this argument. (State's Br., p. 11).

In short, Ms. Ford believes that this court can decide this case without a *Machner* hearing but would welcome such a hearing if ordered on remand.

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Conclusion

For these reasons, Ms. Ford again asks the court to reverse the finding of incompetency entered against her on November 11, 2021 or, in the alternative, remand to the circuit court for a *Machner* hearing.

Dated this 13th day of February, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

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Certification as to Form/Length

I hereby certify that this brief conforms to the rules contained in §. 809.19 (8) (b), (bm), and (c) for a brief. The length of this brief is 1,266 words.

Dated this 13th day of February, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

Electronically signed by Kimberley Bayer State Bar No. 1087900 P.O. Box 14081 West Allis, WI 53214 (414) 975-1861 bayerlaw3@gmail.com Attorney for Ms. Ford