STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN SUPREME COURT

Case No. 2022AP730-CR

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RYAN D. WILKIE,

Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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ISSUE PRESENTED

The state charged Wilkie with obstructing an officer and disorderly conduct. Wilkie moved to dismiss the obstructing charge, arguing that police had no lawful authority to enter his home without a warrant and that the complaint omitted facts that, had they been included, would establish a lack of probable cause.

> Under the totality of the circumstances at the time police attempted to enter Wilkie's home, did the Fourth Amendment prohibit warrantless entry such that the police were not acting with lawful authority when Wilkie denied their attempt to enter?

The circuit court initially found that police had lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home under the "community caretaking" function and denied Wilkie's motions to dismiss. After Wilkie moved for reconsideration based on *Caniglia v. Strom,* 593 U.S. 194 (2021), the circuit court found instead that exigent circumstances justified the entry. Wilkie was convicted of obstructing at trial.[1]

[1] On appeal, Wilkie also argued that the state failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to overcome Wilkie's presumption of innocence on the obstruction charge. If this Court grants review, it should also decide whether the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that police had lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home and whether Wilkie knew police had lawful authority to enter his home.

The court of appeals affirmed after finding that police had lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. *State v. Wilkie,* No 2022AP730, unpublished slip op., ¶19 (Wis. App. March 11, 2025) (App. 12-13).

This Court should grant review, clarify the law, and find that, under the totality of the circumstances at the time they sought warrantless entry, police did not have lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home.

CRITERIA FOR REVIEW

Under the Fourth Amendment, "the home is first among equals." *Florida v. Jardines,* 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). This case involves a unique set of facts that exemplify the clash between an individual's right to be free from "the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed" and the constitutional bounds of a police officer's authority to enter a home without a warrant based on purported safety concerns. *Payton v. New York,* 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).

Here, Wilkie moved to dismiss a criminal complaint that charged him with obstructing an officer based on his decision to deny police entry into his home without a warrant. (R.13). The circuit court denied the motions by initially finding that police had "lawful authority" to enter Wilkie's home because the officers' "community caretaker function" was "validly executed." (R.36:7; App. 35). When faced with binding

authority that the "community caretaking function" does not apply to warrantless entries into a home, *Caniglia,* 593 U.S. at 188-99, the circuit court denied Wilkie's motion to reconsider by finding that police had lawful authority to enter based on "exigent circumstances." (R.70:3-4; App. 41-42).

After Wilkie was convicted at trial and filed his appellant's brief in the court of appeals, the state abandoned its "community caretaking" argument. Instead, the state argued that warrantless entry "was legally authorized by the emergency aid exception." *Wilkie,* No. 2022AP730, ¶17 (App. 11). The court of appeals agreed using a "two-part test to determine whether the emergency aid exception applies." *Id.,* ¶¶18-19 (App. 12-14).

But in applying that test, the court of appeals considered facts not known to police at the time they sought warrantless entry into Wilkie's home while ignoring other facts known to the officer at that time. *Id.,* ¶19, n.10-11 (App. 12-14). Because this approach conflicts with the Supreme Court's demand that courts "look[ ] to the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer as he decides to make a warrantless entry," this court should grant review and clarify the law. *Lange v. California,* 594 U.S. 295, 302 (2011).

Members of this Court have recognized that—given the "newfound uncertainty" in this area of constitutional law following the decision in *Caniglia*—this Court "must work to ensure that" judicial decisions "have a firm foundation in United States

Supreme Court precedent." *State v. Wiskowski,* 2024 WI 23, ¶75, 412 Wis. 2d 185, 7 N.W.3d 474 (Hagedorn, J. concurring). Because Supreme Court precedent demands that the reasonableness of a warrantless entry in a home must be measured objectively based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time they decide to enter, the decision here lacked that firm foundation. *Lange,* 594 U.S. at 302.

Thus, this Court should take the opportunity to continue the "discussion" that began in *Wiskowski* and to clarify and harmonize the law about when emergency circumstances give police lawful authority to enter a home without a warrant. *Wiskowski,* 412 Wis. 2d 185*,* ¶¶74-75; *See* Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r)(a), (c), and (d). In doing so, this Court should ensure that any exception to the warrant requirement permitting entry into a home is "jealously and carefully drawn" and reflects the "centuries-old principle that the home is entitled to special protection." *Lange,* 594 U.S. at 303.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Wilkie is the primary caregiver for his teenage daughter, Sabrina.[2] On December 11, 2019, when Sabrina was 15 years old, she engaged in a verbal argument with Wilkie at their home in Eau Claire after Wilkie grounded her and took her phone.

[2] Wilkie adopts the pseudonym used by the court of appeals to protect Wilkie's daughter's privacy.

(R.73:86, 105-106; App. 50, 66-67). At some point that night Sabrina attempted to leave the home in extremely cold weather wearing only sweatpants and a t-shirt. (R.73:105, 113, 118, 125; App. 66, 74, 79, 86). Sometime during the argument, Wilkie and Sabrina were yelling and Sabrina slammed her bedroom door. (R.73:107, 119; App. 68, 80).

Around the time of the argument, Wilkie's neighbor in the adjoining duplex, Terry McClure, called 911 to report "yelling and banging" coming from Wilkie's residence. (R.73:82; App. 46). Eau Claire Police Department Officer Dominic Meincke was then "dispatched to a possible domestic altercation" and was told that "the caller reported hearing some loud banging noises and yelling and screaming from the residence and heard a female voice yelling 'no' and 'stop.'" (R.73:87; App. 51).

According to Meincke, when he and his partner, Officer Vang, arrived at Wilkie's home he believed there was "possibly" an emergency in the home. (R.73:91-92; App. 55-56). According to an audio recording from the scene, right after contacting Wilkie, Wilkie asked Meincke to "watch the back door, I don't want my daughter bailing out the back door." (R.55:1; App. 90). After Wilkie asked, "is there somebody back there," Meincke replied, "yeah, yep" and confirmed that there was "definitely" someone back there. (R.55:1; App. 90).

According to the audio recording, Meincke asked if he could enter Wilkie's home to "talk with" Wilkie's

family. (R.55:1; App. 90). Wilkie told Meincke that "she" could "come out" but the officers could not "trample through" his house. (R.55:1; App. 90). Wilkie told Meincke to "get a warrant," and told him there was "nobody hurt in there." (R.55:1; App. 90). After Wilkie tried to end the conversation, Meincke detained him. (R.55:2, R.73:89-90; App. 53-54, 91). When Wilkie told Meincke he did not have permission to enter the home, Meincke arrested him and placed him in handcuffs. (R.55:3, R.73:94; App. 58, 92). While Meincke was arresting Wilkie, someone came outside the house to talk and Meincke told her to "get back in the house." (R.55:3; R.73:93-94; App. 57-58, 92).

At the time Meincke arrested Wilkie, he had not talked to McClure but he knew that nobody saw anything physical happen. (R.73:92; App. 56). Meincke knew that there was a back door to the home and it was possible the he or another officer could have entered the home through the back door. (R.73:92; App. 56). Neither Meincke nor any other officer ever entered the home. (R.73:92-93; App. 56-57). According to Meincke, Wilkie was "standing in the door" but did not otherwise take any physical action to prevent the officers from entering the home. (R.73:91, 95; App. 56, 59).

While he claimed that he believed there may be a medical emergency inside the home, Meincke decided that they could "figure it out" later because Wilkie was the "problem person" that needed to be dealt with. (R.55:3, R.73:95; App. 59, 92). Rather than attempting to enter the home either through the front

door or the available back door, and rather than accepting Wilkie's offer to bring Sabrina out to talk, Meincke arrested Wilkie because he was "uncooperative." (R.73:94-95; App. 58-59).

After the arrest, the state charged Wilkie with obstructing an officer and disorderly conduct. (R.2:1; App. 26). The complaint alleged that the officers told Wilkie they wanted to "speak with the individuals inside the residence and to make sure everyone was safe." (R.2:2; App. 27). According to the complaint, Vang told Wilkie to "step away from the door so that officers could go inside and verify everyone's safety, but [Wilkie] refused and wanted to go back inside the residence." (R.2:2; App. 27). According to the complaint, Wilkie "refused" to move, "even when officers attempted to escort him away from the door" when he was "detained." (R.2:2; App. 27).

The complaint made no mention of Wilkie's recorded statement or the fact that he immediately asked the officers to go to the back door so Sabrina didn't leave out the back. (R.55:1; App. 90). The complaint also said nothing about Wilkie's offer to have Sabrina come out to speak with the officers. (R.55:1; App. 90).

While the complaint discussed a phone call between Meincke and McClure about McClure's belief that a female was being attacked, the complaint omitted the fact that the phone call occurred after the officers arrested Wilkie and spoke to Sabrina (R.2:2, R.73:92; App. 27, 56). The transcript of the 911 call

also revealed that McClure never told dispatch that he believed anyone was injured. (R.56:1-2). Instead, the transcript showed that McClure told 911 that he did not "know what they're doing, they fight all the time but it doesn't normally get this loud." (R.56:1).

Wilkie moved to dismiss the criminal complaint for two reasons. First, he moved to dismiss because the complaint did not contain probable cause to establish that Wilkie obstructed an officer. (R.12:1). Wilkie argued that the officers were not acting with lawful authority when they tried to enter his home and detained him without a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or the justification of the community caretaker function. (R.12:1-2).

Next, Wilkie moved to dismiss under *Franks v. Delaware,* 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and *State v. Mann,* 123 Wis. 2d 375, 367 N.W.2d 209 (1985). Wilkie argued that the state omitted critical information from the complaint that, had it been included, would have resulted in a lack of probable cause. (R.17:1-2). Wilkie offered recorded statements taken from Meincke's squad audio as proof of the omissions and proof of a lack of probable cause to show that the officers were acting with lawful authority when they tried to enter Wilkie's home and detained him. (R.17:2-3).

At a hearing on Wilkie's motions to dismiss, the circuit court accepted the state's assertion that the "primary focus in entering the home would be to ensure the safety of the occupants." (R.36:6; App. 13). The court held that the police "community caretaker

function" was "validly executed in this case." (R.36:7; App. 14).

The court rejected Wilkie's *Franks-Mann* argument and found that the omitted information would not "change the analysis regarding the community caretaker function." (R.36:7; App. 14) Thus, the court denied Wilkie's motions because "[t]he indication of banging noises and a person screaming is sufficient in this case for the police to seek to enter into the home under the community caretaker function." (R.36:7; App. 14).

Wilkie later moved for reconsideration based on the Supreme Court's decision in *Caniglia* and argued that *Caniglia* abrogated applicable aspects of Wisconsin caselaw on the community caretaker function. (R.37:2-3). At a hearing on the motion to reconsider, Wilkie argued that no exigent circumstances existed that would otherwise grant the officers lawful authority to attempt to enter the home. (R.70:2-3; App. 19-20). The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider and held that "this is the type of situation that exigent circumstances does cover." (R.70:3-4; App. 20-21).

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Relevant trial testimony is discussed above and incorporated into the argument below. After the state rested, Wilkie moved for a directed verdict on the obstructing charge arguing that Wilkie did not prevent the officers from entering the home and the officers could have entered through the back door. (R.73:96-99; App. 39-42). The

court noted it was "not the most clear-cut case," but denied the motion. (R.73:99; App. 42).

The jury found Wilkie guilty of both obstructing an officer and disorderly conduct. (R.51, R.52, R.73:163). The court of appeals affirmed. *Wilkie,* 2022AP730, ¶¶25, 34 (App.). In its decision, the court of appeals considered only the facts in the criminal complaint—which included facts unknown to the officer at the time of the attempted entry and excluded facts relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. *Id.,* ¶19, n.10-11 (App. 12-15). Based on those facts, the court of appeals found that "officers had lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home on the basis of the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." *Id.,* ¶19. (App. 12-13).[3]

[3] The court of appeals also held that the state presented sufficient evidence at trial to establish that Wilkie obstructed an officer. *Id.,* ¶26 (App. 18-19). Whether police had lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home and whether Wilkie knew police had lawful authority is also central to Wilkie's claim on the sufficiency of the evidence presented on appeal. If this Court grants review, it should also address that claim.

ARGUMENT

This Court should grant review, clarify the law, and hold that the circuit court erred in denying Wilkie's motions to dismiss because police lacked lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home without a warrant.

A. Criminal complaints, obstructing an officer, and the Fourth Amendment.

A criminal complaint must establish probable cause by setting forth facts that are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that a crime was probably committed and the accused probably committed it. *State v. Adams,* 152 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 447 N.W.2d 90 (Ct. App. 1989). If a defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the complaint omits critical information that, if inserted, prevents a finding of probable cause, the complaint must be dismissed. *Mann,* 123 Wis. 2d at 387.

The complaint here alleged that Wilkie obstructed an officer under Wis. Stat. § 946.41. Based on that statutory language, the complaint must set forth the essential facts to establish probable cause that: (1) Wilkie obstructed an officer; (2) the officer was acting with lawful authority; and (3) Wilkie knew or believed he was obstructing the officer while the officer was acting in an official capacity. *State v. Lossman,* 118 Wis. 2d 526, 536, 348 N.W.2d 159.

To act with lawful authority, an officer's actions must be lawful. *State v. Ferguson,* 2009 WI 50, ¶14, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187. "It is black letter law that a constitutional violation is an unlawful act" *Id.* at 15. Thus, in reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, this court should decide whether police entry into Wilkie's home was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and whether Wilkie knew that police entry into his home was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

At the "very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion." *Collins v. Virginia,* 584 U.S. 586, 592 (2018). The Fourth Amendment "draw[s] a firm line at the entrance to the house" and "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which [it] is directed." *Payton,* 445 U.S. at 585, 590. Police may enter a home without a warrant to "assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury." *Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,* 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). But that entry must be reasonable based on an objective assessment of "the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer as he decides to make a warrantless entry." *Lange,* 594 U.S. at 302.

Here, under the totality of the circumstances at the time—including the facts omitted from the criminal complaint—warrantless entry into Wilkie's home was unreasonable. As a result, the state failed to meet its burden to show that officers had lawful authority to demand entry into Wilkie's home and that

Wilkie knew he was obstructing officers who were acting with lawful authority. Thus, this Court should grant review, reverse the circuit court and court of appeals and order that Wilkie's conviction for obstructing an officer be vacated.

B. Under the totality of the circumstances at the time of attempted entry, neither the community caretaker function nor the emergency aid exception justified warrantless entry into Wilkie's home.

It is undisputed that officers had no warrant to enter and search Wilkie's home. *Wilkie,* No. 2022AP730, ¶15. Absent a "carefully delineated" and "narrowly drawn" exception, a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable. *State v. Ware,* 2021 WI App. 83, ¶19, 400 Wis. 2d 118, 968 N.W.2d 752. The state bears the burden to prove that a warrantless search meets one of those exceptions. *Id.* Here, the state did not meet that burden at any stage.

In denying Wilkie's motions to dismiss, the circuit court initially relied on the "community caretaker function." (R.36:7; App. 14). According to the court, even if it considered undisputed evidence that the state omitted from the complaint, there was still probable cause because the police were operating under a community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement. (*Id.*). When faced with *Caniglia* and Wilkie's motion to reconsider, the circuit court brushed aside undisputed evidence omitted from the complaint, distinguished *Caniglia* on the facts, and

accepted the state's rebranding of the issue as "exigent circumstances." (R.70:2-4; App. 19-21).

On appeal, the state abandoned its community caretaker argument entirely and—for the first time—argued that warrantless entry was lawful under the "emergency aid exception." *Wilkie,* No. 2022AP730, ¶17 (App. 11). In other words, on appeal, the parties agreed that the community caretaker exception did not give police lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home. *Id.,* ¶16 (App. 10-11).

To prove that the emergency aid exception gave police lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home, the state must prove that police had "an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within [the home] [was] in need of immediate aid." *Michigan v. Fisher,* 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009)., ¶21 (citation omitted). Wisconsin courts have applied a two-part test to determine whether the exception is met:

> [U]nder the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that: (1) there was an immediate need to provide aid or assistance to a person due to an actual or threatened physical injury; and (2) that immediate entry into an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy was necessary in order to provide that aid or assistance.

Ware, 400 Wis. 2d 118, ¶22 (quoting *State v. Bogges,* 115 Wis. 2d 443, 452, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983).

Police need not have "ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." *Fisher,* 558 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted). But "the rule demands that the government official's actions be motivated solely by a perceived need to render immediate aid or assistance, not by a need or desire to obtain evidence for a possible prosecution." *Bogges,* 115 Wis. 2d at 450. Given the "nature of emergencies," courts must assess the facts on a "case-specific" basis and "look to the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer as he decides to make a warrantless entry." *Lange,* 594 U.S. at 302 (citation omitted). Based on the facts at the time Wilkie refused warrantless entry—including critical facts that were omitted from the criminal complaint—it was objectively unreasonable to conclude that immediate entry was necessary to render aid.

Here, despite Wilkie's *Franks-Mann* motion, the circuit court and court of appeals disregarded undisputed facts that were omitted from the complaint when finding probable cause. The court of appeals looked only to the four corners of the complaint when assessing probable cause and whether Meinicke had lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home without a warrant. *Wilkie,* 2022AP730, ¶19, n.10-11 (App. 12-14). By looking solely at the four corners of the complaint, the court of appeals considered facts that were not known to police at the time they sought entry into Wilkie's home—which conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. *Lange,* 594 U.S. at 302.

Had the circuit court and court of appeals followed Supreme Court precedent and assessed the totality of the objective facts known to the officers *at the time* they sought warrantless entry and arrested Wilkie for refusing their entry, both courts would have rejected the state's claim that police were acting with lawful authority under the emergency aid exception.

The first prong of the emergency aid exception requires an objectively reasonable belief that an "actual or threatened physical injury" occurred. *Ware,* 400 Wis. 2d 118, ¶24. Here, police had only generalized concerns about safety based on a verbal argument. Officer Meincke was "dispatched to a possible domestic altercation" and knew that "the caller reported hearing some loud banging noises and yelling and screaming from the residence and heard a female voice yelling 'no' and 'stop.'" (R.73:87; App. 51). Wilkie came to the door upon police arrival, and immediately asked Meincke to "watch the back door, I don't want my daughter bailing out the back door." (R.55:1; App. 69).

Contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, at the time Meincke attempted to enter Wilkie's home, he was unaware of McClure's belief that a female was being attacked and his belief that someone was injured. (R.2:2, R.73:92; R.56:1-2; App. 27, 56). Instead, all police knew about McClure's observations was that he did not "know what they're doing, they fight all the time but it doesn't normally get this loud." (R.56:1). Any generalized concern based on those circumstances was not enough to establish that an emergency existed. *See State v. Reed,* 2018 WI 109,

¶79, 384 Wis. 2d 469, ¶92, 920 N.W.2d 56 (holding that generalized concerns for safety are not enough to establish exigent circumstances).

The second prong of the emergency aid exception requires an objectively reasonable belief that "immediate entry" was necessary. *Ware,* 400 Wis. 2d 118, ¶27. Here, Wilkie came to the door when the officers arrived, he admitted he had an argument with Sabrina, and he offered to have her come out to talk to police and confirm she was ok. (R.55:1; App. 90). Under those circumstances, it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to believe that "immediate entry was necessary to provide aid or assistance to a person." *Id.* This became abundantly clear when—rather than entering Wilkie's home to render aid—Meincke arrested Wilkie and declared that they could "figure it out" later because Wilkie was the "problem person" that needed to be dealt with. (R.55:3, R.73:95; App. 59, 92).

By looking only at the language of the complaint despite Wilkie's *Franks-Mann* motion, the court of appeals erroneously found that Wilkie "refused to let anyone come outside the residence." *Wilkie,* No. 2022AP730, ¶20 (App. 15). And by ignoring undisputed evidence omitted from the complaint, the court of appeals also erroneously considered a second call between McClure and Meineke that occurred after Wilkie was already arrested. *Id.,* ¶19, n.11 (App. 12-14). Accordingly, the court of appeals erroneously considered facts unknown to police at the time of attempted entry—that McClure believed someone had

been "struck or thrown to the ground" and that McClure believed "the female was being attacked and harmed by the male." *Id.* (App. 12-14).

Even considering those unknown facts, the record here stands in stark contrast to the facts in *Ware* and demonstrate that this was not a situation in which immediate aid was required. In *Ware*, the officers received a 911 call with information that the caller had "observed a large amount of blood coming from a truck parked in the garage." *Ware,* 400 Wis. 2d 118, ¶24. Officers were informed that Ware and his girlfriend had been "experiencing relationship troubles" and the caller "had not seen" the girlfriend "since the previous night." *Id.* The officers were also told that Ware had access to a firearm and had been drinking. *Id.* When police arrived, Ware told them, "I am the one you are looking for." *Id.*

In other words, unlike in *Ware*—where there was clear corroborated evidence of an immediate need to render emergency aid to an injured person—the officers here had no reason to believe someone suffered an "actual or threatened physical injury" and had no reason to believe that "immediate entry" was required. *Id*. Any claim that police needed to render emergency aid is belied by the fact that the police priority was to "deal with" Wilkie by arresting him because he did not comply with their demand to enter and they could "only deal with one thing at a time." (R.55:2-3; App. 91-92). Here, Wilkie correctly identified and pointed out the need for police to obtain a warrant to enter his home. (R.55:1; App. 90).

Considering the totality of the circumstances at the time of the attempted warrantless entry—including critical information omitted from the criminal complaint—the state cannot prove that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement gave police lawful authority to enter Wilkie's home. Thus, the complaint could not establish probable cause that police were acting with lawful authority and that Wilkie knew police were acting with lawful authority when he denied their entry into his home. Because the court of appeals considered information that was unknown to police at the time they sought warrantless entry in conflict with Supreme Court precedent, this Court should grant review, clarify the law, and reverse.

CONCLUSION

Based on the information above, Ryan D. Wilkie respectfully requests that this Court grant review, clarify the law, reverse the lower courts, and vacate Wilkie's obstruction conviction.

Dated this 10th day of April, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

Electronically signed by
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CERTIFICATION AS TO FORM/LENGTH

I hereby certify that this petition conforms to the rules contained in s. 809.19(8)(b), (bm) and 809.62(4). The length of this petition is 4,357 words.

CERTIFICATION AS TO APPENDIX

I hereby certify that filed with this petition is an appendix that complies with s. 809.19(2)(a) and that contains, at a minimum: (1) a table of contents; (2) the findings or opinion of the circuit court; (3) a copy of any unpublished opinion cited under s. 809.23(3)(a) or (b); and (4) portions of the record essential to an understanding of the issues raised, including oral or written rules or decisions showing the circuit court's reasoning regarding those issues.

I further certify that if this appeal is taken from a circuit court order or judgment entered in a judicial review or an administrative decision, the appendix contains the findings of fact and conclusions of law, if any, and final decision of the administrative agency.

I further certify that if the record is required by law to be confidential, the portions of the record included in the appendix are reproduced using one or more initials or other appropriate pseudonym or designation instead of full names of persons, specifically including juveniles and parents of juveniles, with a notation that the portions of the record have been so reproduced to preserve confidentiality and with appropriate references to the record.

Dated this 10th day of April, 2025.

Signed:
Electronically signed by
David J. Susens
DAVID J. SUSENS
Assistant State Public Defender