STATE OF WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT
CASE No. 21-AP-765
CASE No. 18-CF-1428

State of Wisconsin,
Respondent,

v.

Antonio Darnell Mays,
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Antonio Darnell Mays
Green Bay Corr. Inst.
P.O. Box 19033
Green Bay, WI
54307

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"Wisconsin Constitution" (Article 1) "Right of Accused" (Section 7); In all Criminal pro--secutions the (accused) shall enjoy the right to be (heard by himself) and (counsel); to de--mand the nature and cause of the accusa--tion against him; to meet the "Witnesses" (face to face); to have (Compulsory process) to Compel the Attendance of Witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a (Speedy public trial) by an (impartial jury) of the County or district Wherein the offense shall have been Commi--tted; which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law. . . .

"United States Constitutiona Amend. (6th); In all Criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a (Speedy and public trial) by an (impartial jury) of the State and dis--trict Wherein the Crime shall have been Committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa--tion; to be "Confronted with the Witnesses against him;" to have "Compulsory process" for obtaining Witnesses in his favor and to have the Assistance of Counsel for His Defense".

"United States Const. Amendment (14th) (Section 1)
"All person born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are Citizens of the United States and of the State, Wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of Citizens of the United States; Nor Shall any State deprive an person of, Life, Liberty, or Property, Without Due Process of Law; Nor, Deny to any person Within its Jurisdiction the Equal Protection of the Law. . . .

"STATEMENT OF ISSUES"

1.) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel.
2.) Trial Court Judge Vidated U.S.C.A. Const. 6th and 14th Amendments.
3.) State Crime Laboratory DNA Analysis, used up all the "DNA EVIDENCES" from the "Defense".
4.) Prosecutorial Misconduct, By Presenting "False EVIDENCES", "False Documents", and "False Testimony" And Withholding (Evidences) from the Defense that would Show that the defendant did not Committ the Crimes.
5.) Court of Appeals ERRORED In Dening Petitioner Supplemental Motion, as well as Circuit-Court also errored in Dening Petitioner's - Supplemental Motion. . .

"Statement of Facts"

1.) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel. Petitioner, Antonio Damell Mays, Contends, - Appellate Counsel, John T. Wasielewski, is ineffe-ctive assistance of appellate counsel, for fail-ing to present (issues and merits) that is - "Stronger than the "one issue" he presented to the "Courts", Whereas petitioner, Mays, had to "present the Stronger issues" and "merits" that is Within the (Jury trial transcripts) dated "October 15, 2018" thur "October 19, 2018" Petitioner, Mays, had to "present a supplemental motion/ brief", in "order" for the (issues and merits) can be (preserved) that are "much Stronger" and under "Wis. Stat. s. 809.15(3), and (4), (c), Wherefore Counsel's failure to raise an (issue) on "direct appeal" may prevent the defendant from raising it in a subsequent s. 974.06 "Collateral review" processing, absent "Sufficient reason. State v. Escobar-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d. 168, 517 N.W. 2d. 157 (1994). Petitioner Mays, Contends, trial Court Judge, David Borowski, abused his "discretion" when he "Violated" petitioner's "Wis. Const. Art. 1 - (Sec. 7), and "U.S.C.A. 6th and 14th" rights, on "September 04, 2018" "September, 06, 2018" and on "September 13, 2018", Petitioner Mays, filed a motion for substitution of Judge, pursuant to "Wis. Stat. 971.20", because State's Attorney

turnover "State Crime Lab. Reports" before petit-
-ioner, Mays, first (jury trial) was to start on -
"August 16, 2018" and on the 88th Day of petitioner's
(90days) "Speed trial", on "September 04, 2018"
trial defense counsels, asked "trial court judge,
David Borawski," for time to hire our own "DNA
Specialist", from the (public defender offices), so
We can have all the "State Crime Laboratory" -
(DNA Evidences and Samples) "re-tested", defen-
-se counsels was (Denied) by Circuit Court judge
David Borawski, on (09-04-18) and on (09-06-18) to
allow the defense the time (needed) to "Hire
our own DNA Specialist before jury trial", please
see "Jury Trial Transcripts" dated "September 04 2018"
and "September 06, 2018" a.m. on petitioner's -
(Speedy trial). Trial court judge, David Borawski,
also "violated petitioner Mays's "Speed trial" by
"Not allowing the petitioner, Mays, to Leave the
"milwaukee County Jail" after petitioner's Mays,
(family paid his bail) on "September 06, 2018" on
or of $2,500^{00} dollars on the (90th Day) of the
"Speedy trial demand", trial court judge david
borawski, held petitioner MAYS (13th days) after
his (90th DAYS), Whereas, petitioner Mays's "Jury
Trial" started on "October 15, 2018" not even
"30 DAYS" after (released) on (09-19-18) and on
(09-13-18), Petitioner Mays "Filed a Motion for
Substitution of a Judge", pursuant to Wis.

Stat. (971.20), against Judge David Borowski, and Judge Borowski, as just like all of the other motions filed in Judge Borowski, Courtroom, he (refused to rule on the motions) before him, the motion for substitution of Judge, under s. 971.20, was made on the grounds of "Conflict of interest" do to Judge, Borowski continue to "Violate petitioner's Constitutions rights to both "Constitutions", the "right to a fair trial and due process", Petitioner, MAYS, Contends, Judge Borowski, and some of the "Jurors" felled "asleep" while the "State's Attorney" had "Witnesses on the witness's stand", please see "Jury Trial Transcripts dated 10-17-18 and 10-18-18 p.m"; Whereas ada Hanna Kolberg Kelp calling the Judge's name while he was asleep, so She Can "Submit her exhibits" and then Judge Borowski, (woke-up) and had the "deputies" take all the (Jurors) out of the "Courtroom" so he can talk about how some of the juras was falling asleep doing trial, While the State attorney had "Witnesses on the stand testifing, on (10-17-18 and 10-18-18). Judge Borowski was also talking about how the Court of appeals think he don't know how to do his job Cause I guest the Court of appeals had "overturned" some of his Cases, this Had nothing to do with My trial Judge

Borowski, was very "unprofessional, At my jury trial to wherefore, "I wrote Chief Judge about his actions during my jury trial, and on "Sepetmeber 20, 2018," Attorney general and supervisor for the "Wisconsin State Crime laboratory" came to "petitioner, MAYS's (bail hearing) on (9-20-18) = because on (09-04-18) and (09-06-18) Judge David Borowski, was "talking Real Bad" about the "Att-orney general and State Crime lab." and the Supervisor from "madison" came to the "bail-hearing" "which was never held", because when the judge was (talking bad about them) and the milwaukee journal newspaper was in the Courtroom and they wrote and printed every-thing Judge David Borowski was (saying) about the (way the "State Crime laboratory handled the (evidences) within Case no. 18-CF-1428, and the "Supervisor from (madison) State Crime Lab.-oratory, Came and talked about "What and Why" it took so long with the (DNA Results) State-Crime lab. on (03-20-2018) DNA Supervisor, Stated that they (tested the two (2) handguns and DNA Samples 1,620 times) to whereas there was "No More DNA Samples left for the defense to have re-tested", and in July 16, 2018 a (DNA Report) was submitted to the district att-orney office, done by "State Crime labor-atory DNA Analysis, Amber Rasmussen. . .

"STATEMENT OF FACTS"

"DNA Analysis Amber Rasmussen" (used up all the and destroyed DNA Evidences), DNA analysis Amber Rasumssen mode two (2) "DNA Reports" case no. #R-18-1184 report #3 agency no #18-074-0172/ M5744, after (testing the DNA evidences) over (1,620 times) and the "DNA Reports" continue to show lots of "Contaimination within the DNA reports, on (page 2) of "DNA report #R-18-1184" DNA expert, Amber Rasmussen, dated "July 16, 2018, - Whereas, DNA analysis, Rasmussen, had the DNA evidences since "March 20, 2018" and DNA analysis Rasmussen, stated; "on "July 16, 2018" that a poss- -ible (Hair, Fiber) was obsereved on the (Taurus) magazine swabs (item AK1) but was not - examined". Petitioner, Antonio D. Mays, Conte- -nds, "What did DNA analysis Rasmussen, do with the (DNA Samples) (hair, fiber, and blood) that she (testify) on (10-17-18 or 10-18-18) she found on "one of the guns", Petitioner, Mays, Contends, In this same "DNA report" on (page 3) "STR- -DNA" (Result) were detected from the (Hipoint) sight, trigger, and guard and magzine swabs and from the (Taurus) sight, button, slide, and magazine swabs, (Items, AB1, AD1, AF1, AG1, AH1, and AK1), "However this data does not supp- -ort any (Comparisons to other STR-DNA - Profiles), Due to the (Complexity of the Mix-

-tures and Limited amount of (genetic) inf-
-ormation available... DNA analysis, Rasmussen
"used-up all the DNA Samples" to were she -
knew that the "defense would not have a -
chance to (re-test) the (DNA Samples) "under
"s. 974.07." It is stated in, Greenwold, and Young-
-blood, that a defendant's rights are violated
if the police, (1). failed to (preserve the evid-
-ences), that is apparently exculpatory; or (2).
acted in bad faith by failing to (preserve
evidence) which is "potentially exculpatory".
State v. Greenwold, 189 Wis. 2d. 59, 68 (1994). The
Youngblood, analysis further suggested that if
the materiality of the evidence rises above
being (potentially useful) to clearly (excul-
-patory) a "bad faith" analysis need not be -
evoked, the defendants rights are "violated"
because of the "apparetly exculpatory" nat-
-ure of the evidence, (Not preserved). Arizona
v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). The investigat-
-ing officer failed to (preserve) "apparently
potential exculpatory DNA evidences", Whereas
DNA analysis Rasmussen on (10-17-18) a.m. or on
(10-18-18) a.m. testified on "Cross-examinena-
-tion, that she found (blood) on one of
the (guns) evidences and when asked by def-
-ense counsels why she did not put that
she found "blood on one of the guns", DNA

analysis, Rasmussen, Stated because she threw the "blood sample away;" She was aware of the "apparently potential DNA evidences", and its Location and its presence, however She gave a "dismissive" reason for the abandon-ment and destroying potential DNA evid--ences" please see Jury trial transcripts (10-17--18) or (10-18-18) a.m and p.m. the investigating DNA analysis, Rasmussen "did not secure any of the other Samples of the DNA evidences She found (Hair, Fiber, or Blood) Nor did She "Save" any of the DNA Samples, She (tested) which did so contained relevant "DNA" that could had (potential exculpatory) evidence that could had provided a (DNA Result) from it! Which made it more "exculpatory with potentially for an result". Petitioner, MAYS - Contends, that the (dna reports) shows that "DNA expert Amber Rasmussen, were aware of potential DNA evidences, and DNA analysis - Amber Rasmussen Knew this "DNA was poten--tial exculpatory DNA evidences" that was presence and had a Location of potential DNA evidences. DNA analysis, Rasmussen made a "Conscious effort to not test importance dna evidences, or to (preserve any of the dna samples she tested 1,620 times before Petitioner, MAYS "Jury Trial" Started on "10-15-18

or to "preserves any DNA Samples" She test-ed. Petitioner, Mays, Contends, I wanted the "DNA Evidence re-tested on "post conviction relief under" s. 974.07 DNA TESTED" and I Can not because DNA analysis, Rasmussen disregarded her own "State Crime laboora-tory policies and procedures, with the State Attorney Hanna Kolberg knew what DNA analysis, Rasmussen had "used-up and destory the rest of the "DNA Evidences" and now petitioner, Mays, Can Not have any of the DNA Evidences or DNA Samples re-tested because of the "State's Negativism" (with the (DNA Evidences) and therefore Petitioner Mays, Rights Under "Wis. Stat. 974.07" and - U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. (14th) "Due process). - Petitioner, Mays, Contends, Dna analysis, Amber Rasmussen, acted in a manner which was either Contrary to applicable policies and Common sense assessments of the evid-ences, reasonably to be expected of the law enforcement officer to so unmindful of both there is a Showing of objective - "bad faith" requirements of the, Trombetta, and Youngblood, "tests". United States V. - Elliot, 83 F. Supp. 2d. 637, 647, 648 (1999). Chen, 109, W. Va. L. Rev. Supra, at 434. The investi-gating officer took the necessary steps

to test Some "DNA Evidences" that "State - Crime laboratory dna analysis, Rasmussen, "used up all the dna evidences and dest- -oryed the rest of the dna evidences", to were petitioner, MAYS, (Due process rights) are "Violated" cause petitioner, Mays, has (nothing to re test) on "postconviction or appeal. A great danger to "Liberty" exist if the State could (pick and choose) evidences for use in prosecution, destory the remai- -nder, and the argue that the (defense) - must show that the "destoryed evidences", Contained "exculpatory" or otherwise "pot- -entially useful and relevant information. Teresa N. Chen, Supra at 446. Based on the "DNA Reports" and "Testimony" from dna analy- -sis, Rasmussen (DNA) was clearly identifi- -able that these (investigation officers) has "denied" the petitioner, MAYS, the - rights to (due process" by "Not furnishing the petitioner (this right to present a Complete and full Defense,) thus denying the petitioner the "equal protection of the law, (974.07). The State's Attorney and dna analysis, (failed to meet these exp- -ectation in, Huggett, Greenwold I and II, -Trombetta, and Youngblood. IN, State v. - Huggett, 2010 WI App. 69, 324. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court decision to (dismiss) all "Charges" with prejudice due to the State's failure to (preserve evidences) which was equally available to both parties.

"Statement of Facts"

"Prosecutorial Misconduct, by Presenting False-Evidences, Documents and False Testimony to the (Jurors).

Petitioner, Antonio Darnell Mays, Contends, on "October 15, 2018" (A.M. Jury Trial) "Ada Hanna Kolberg, provide (False statements) in her-"Opening Statement to the Jurors" by telling the (Jurors) petitioner MAYS, was (Shot by the Victim's Gun) and petitioner, MAYS (Shot the Victims) Known She had "no real evidence" of "Who Shot Who" when ada hanna kolberg-(never had or got any bullets to test-against any (Gun Weapons) to say Who Shot Who), when ada hanna kolberg, Knew she had "No Murder Weapons" in this case no. 18-CF-1428, ada hanna kolberg, (told the Jurors petitioner, MAYS was Shot by the Victim's gun) when She Knew she had no real-Evidences on Who Shot the petitioner, Mays. Petitioner, Mays, Contends, Ada Hanna Kolberg also (misled the Jurors), when She put Seven (7) Guns in front of the (Jurors) that had

nothing to do with the "Case no. 18-CF-128," none of the (seven guns) had anything to do with the Crimes, please see "Exhibit B" (Firearm's tool makering) dated "August 16, 2018" None of these (firearms) had anything to do with the Case, Therefore, Ada Hanna Kol-berg should never "presented these guns to the (Jurors) When ada Kalberg knew those "Seven (7) Guns" had nothing to do with the Case, Wherefore ada Kalberg presented (False Evidences) to obtain a "guilty verdit" by Showing these guns to the (Jurors) that had nothing to do with the Crime, ada Kalberg allowed DNA analysis Rasmussen to "Falsely Testify" on the witness's stand, When DNA analysis, Rasmussen, Stated "She found Blood on one of the guns, in her dna report, dated (July 16, 18), when dna analysis knew She never found any "blood on any of the (guns) She "tested" and State Attorney "never Correct" the knowingly "perjured information" from State's witness. One of the bedrock principle of our democracy "implict in any concept of ordered Liberty is that the "State May Not use false Evidence to obtain a Criminal Con-viction." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L.Ed. 2d. 1217, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959). Deliberate deception of a (Judge and Jury) is inconsis-

-tent With the "rudimentary demands of - Justice". Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 79 L.Ed. 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935). Thus a Conviction obtained through "use of false evidences" Known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the "Fourteenth Amendment", Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. (Citation omitted) "Indeed if it is "establish" that the government Knowingly permitted the introduction of false testimony (reversal) is "Virtually automatic". United States v. Wallach, 935 F. 2d. 445, 456, (2d. Cir. 1991). (quoting (***14). United States v. Stofsky, 527 F. 2d. 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975). In addition the State "Violate a Criminal defendant rights to due process of law" When, although not soliciting false evid- -ence, it allows "false evidence to go uncor- -ected When it appears". Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 2, L.Ed. 2d 9, 78 S.Ct. 103 (1957). Ryle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 87 L.Ed. 214, 63 S.Ct. 177 (1942). In this case (Cadahanna Kolberg) "presented false Statements, evidences and documents, and allowed "dna analysis, Amber Rasmussen" to "Falsely Testify" that "She found Blood on one of the Weapon's evidences", and She (never put it in her dna report dated July 16, 2018.) Id. there is nothing in Napue, or its (**21) predecessor, or its progeny, to suggest that the "Constitution protects defendant-

only against the knowing use of prejury testimony;" Due process protects defendant's against the "knowing use of any false.- evidences" by the (State) whether it be by documents, testimony, or any othee form of admissible evidence." See Phillips v Woodford, 267 F. 3d. 966, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2001). Its well Settled that the presentation of (false evidences) Violates "Due process." (Citing) Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. Because of the - "gravity of depriving a person of Liberty on the basis of (false testimony) Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals, have fashioned over the years a Workable set of precise rules designed not only to - remedy (egregious wrongs) that have already occurred, but also (prophylactically) to prevent damaging "false testimony" from happening in the first place. Petitioner, Mays, Contends adchanna Kolberg, gave knowingly "false statements and evidences, and allowed "dna analysis Rasmussen to (falsely testify) to the (Jurors) in the petitioner's jury trial". The rule originated with Mooney, in (1935), which held that a "Criminal defendant is den-ied Due process", when the State has Contr-ived a "Conviction" through the pretence of a trial which in (truth) is but used as a means

of depriving a defendant of liberty, through a deliberate deception of Court and jury by the "presentation of testimony Known to be perjured.) 294, U.S. at 112. Seven years later, in Ryle, the Supreme Court, expanded this rule to encompass not only perjured testimony, "Knowingly used by the State" but also the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to the Criminal defendant". 317 U.S. at 216. In, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 87 L.Ed. 2d. 481, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985). The Supreme Court noted the well-established rule that a Conviction obtained by the Knowing use of perjured testimony fundamentally unfair and must be "Set aside" if there is any reasonable likelihood that the "false testimony" could have affected the judgement of the jury. That "Constitutional error occurred does not end our analysis. Neither, Napue, nor Alcorta, Creates a "per se rule of reversal. Because the error was not structural, we must asses whether the Constitutional Violation was materal. See United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F. 3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). To Prevail on a Claim based on Mooney, Napue, the petitioner must Show (**31) that (1) the testimony or evidence was actually false. (2) the prosecution knew or

Should have known that the testimony was actually false. (3). the false testimony was material. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F. 3d 972* 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 3744. Petitioner, Mays, Contends on "March 15, 2018" police officer took defendant's Mays's (Cloths and Shoes) as "evidences" to have tested for (gunpowder residue) to see if the -- petitioner, "fire a weapon(s)" on "March 15, 2018" and State's attorney and police (never turnover the results from the testing of petitioner's cloths and shoes for (gunpowder residue). To prevail on a Brady, Claim for an officer failure to dis--close evidence, a plaintiff must shaw that (1). the evidence was favorable to him (2). the officer concealed the evidence. (3). the con--cealedment prejudiced him. Prejudice req--uires proof that the failure to disclose caused a "deprivation of the accused's Liberty". Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Petitioner, Mays, Contends, (1) the Clo--ths and shoes was taken by police officers, for (testing for GPR evidence) to whereas if the State's attorney would had hand over the "results" it would shaw that the petitioner Mays, (never shot a gun or guns) on March 15, 18" (2). police took possession of the petitioner's Cloths and Shoes for evidence and never turned them or the results over to the "defense

Counsels, So they can be (tested for gunpowder residue by the defense to show petitioner Mays never shot any Weapon(s) on "March 15, 18" State's Attorney and Milw. Police Dept. never gave the defense Counsels any (access to the Cloths and Shoes evidences or the results from them (testing the Cloths and Shoes) - evidences for (gunpowder residue). (3). Petitioner Mays, Contends, that by ada hanna Kolberg and mpd officers (withholding the Cloths and Shoes evidences and results from petitioner; Mays was not able to "Show the (Jurors) that He Never Shot or Fire any Weapon(s) on "March 15, 2018"; the night of the Crimes, petitioner, Mays was Denied the "opportunity to show the (Jurors) that He did not Committ these Crimes Wherefore, State Attorney Hanna Kolberg, "never brought Any (Eyewitnesses) to say petitioner Mays Committed any Crimes, please see Jury trial dated open Statements to the Jurors on October 15, 2018 A.M. Ada Hanna Kolberg told the Jurors that She don't have anyone that can Say Mr. Mays Committed these Crimes, and trial Judge allowed her to use "Brandon Jones" text messages from his Cellphone without Mr. Jones been at the Jury trial to (testify) about Who or What those (text messages meant) and Who Mr. Jones was (texting them too), petitioner

Mays (Never got the Chance to Cross-examination Mr. Jones because he was never at the Jury trial From (10-15-18 thur 10-19-18) Petitioner's Counsels "objected to the reading of the text messages to the Jurors, Judge Borowski over ruled and allowed the ade to show and read those (text messages) to them. When there was "no evidences" that Mr. Jones was "text messageing" Petitioner Mays, Contends, He brought all these (issues) and many more up to appellate counsel, John T. Wasielewski, and "appeal Counsel refused to bring the Stronger issues to the courts, therefore Appeal Counsel forced petitioner to file a Supplemental motion to go with Counsels motion to the Courts. Under s.809.14 and s.809.15(3) and (4), (C), wherefore Counsels failure to raise an (issues) on "direct appeal" may prevent the defendant from raising it in a subsequent, s. 974.06 "Collateral review" processing, absent "Sufficient reason. State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W. 2d 157 (1994).

"STATEMENT OF FACTS"

Petitioner, Antonio Darnell Mays, Contends, The Court of appeals errored in its decision dated "July 15, 2021" as follow: Before, Brash, P.J.; Antonio Darnell Mays "Moves for permission to file a supplemental brief "pro se" to add to the

arguments made by his Attorney John T. Wasiele-
-wski, in the appellant brief. (We deny the
Motion.) An appellant who is represented by
Counsel does not have the right to raise -
arguments pro'se. Case no. 2021-AP-765-Cr. —
Petitioner, MAYS, Contends, that the Supplemental
motion to "Assist Counsel motion" because if
Counsel, John T. Wasielewski, was doing his Job,
Petitioner, Mays, "Would Not have to (File a -
motion for Supplemental to (preserved all
the (Issues) within the (jury trial transcripts)
So the (issues) would not be (barred from a
later date), therefore, Petitioner, MAYS's Supple-
-mental motion Should had been (granted)
and "Consolidated with Counsel's motion to
the "Court of appeals" Whereas the Court of App-
-eals admitted that it was a "motion for
Premission to file the Supplemental brief to
(add on to the arguments made by his -
Attorney, not to file against the motion
Counsel filed, Counsel, Wasielewski, is (refusing
to bring all the (Stronger Issues) that is
Within the (jury trial transcripts). In asse-
-ssing Whether an attorney was ineffective
for failing to "present an issue" Courts look
first, to see if the attorney missed a
"Significant and obvious Issues" if so the
Court Compares the "Neglected Issues" to

those actually raised, and if the "Ignored Issues" were Clearly Stronger then Appellate Counsel, was "deficient" to Shaw (prejudice) a petitioner must Shaw that there is a reasonable probability the omitted Claims would have altered the outcome of the appeal had it been raised. Stallings v. United States, 536 F. 3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2008). Actual Con-flict of interest by appellate counsel where Attorney was responsible for Significant delay in handling appeal. Mathis v. Hood, 937 F. 2d. 790 (2d Cir. 1990). Remanding for review of the trial record to determine whether counsel's alleged failure to present "Significant and obvious issues" on appeal was (ineffective - assistance.) Gray v. Greer, 800 F. 2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1985). Ineffective assistance were Cou-nsel failed to raise "obvious issues on appeal." Mason v. Hanks, 9 F. 3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 1996). Petitioner, Mays, Contends, that Within the "Supplemental brief and motion" filed to "Circuit Court" and "Court of Appeals" Should had (Never) been "Denied" on all the "facts Within the "Supplemental brief" that's in the (trial transcripts) record of the petitioner Mays, "Jury Trial" from "October 15, 2018" to "October 19, 2018." Petitioners U.S.C.A. Cont. Amendments 6th and 14th and Wis. Const. (Art. 1), (Sec. 7). ...

"Conclusion for Relief"

Petitioner, Antonio Darnell Mays, Is asking this Honorable Supreme Court to "Grant this" Petition for Review" and look at all the (issues) presented within this "petition for review" and Overturn the decision of the "Court of appeals district 1 and allow all the petitioner's (issues) be Submitted with Attorney John t. Luscielewski motion, under "Wisc. Stats. 809.11(3), 809.14(1), (3) and (a) and (b) as well to (Art 1) (Sec. 7) and have the Court of appeals (rule) on all the (issues) within the "Supplemental Brief", of the petitioner Mays's. And "Set Aside" the "Judgement of Conviction" on "Case no. 18-CF-1428" and Dismissal all Charges With Prejudice on all grounds.

Respectfully Submitted
This 02 Day of August, 2021
/s/ Antonio Darnell Mays
Green Bay Corr. Inst.
P.O. Box 19033
Green Bay, WI
54307

(P.20)

"Certification of Mailing

I, Antonio Darnell Mays, Certify that this petition for review has an appendix and was deposited in the "United States mailbox for delivery to the Clerk, for "Wisconsin Supreme Court" by first class mail on this 01 DAY of August, 2021. . .

"Form and Lenght of Certification"

I, Antonio Darnell Mays, hereby, Certify that this "Petition for Review" conforms to the rules Contained in S.809.19(8), (b) and (c) for a petition Produced With being hand written. . .

Respectfully Submitted

This 01, DAY of August 2021

/S/ Antonio Darnell Mays

Green Bay Cor. Inst.

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(P.21)

Wm. Antonio Marks #266902
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Clerk of the
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